Fault Attacks Sensitivity of Public Parameters in the Dilithium Verification

Fault Attacks Sensitivity of Public Parameters in the Dilithium Verification

연구 분야: Verification

학회: International Conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the verification algorithm of the CRYSTALS-Dilithium, focusing on a C reference implementation. Limited research has been conducted on its susceptibility to fault attacks, despite its critical role in ensuring the scheme’s security. To fill this gap, we investigate three distinct fault models - randomizing faults, zeroizing faults, and skipping faults - to identify vulnerabilities within the verification process. Based on our analysis, we propose a methodology for forging CRYSTALS-Dilithium signatures without knowledge of the secret key. Instead, we leverage specific types of faults during the verification phase and some properties about public parameters to make these signatures accepted. Additionally, we compared different attack scenarios after identifying sensitive operations within the verification algorithm. The most effective requires potentially fewer fault injections than targeting the verification check itself. Finally, we introduce a set of countermeasures designed to thwart all the identified scenarios rendering the verification algorithm intrinsically resistant to the presented attacks.