연구 분야: Infrastructure
학회: DAC '20: Proceedings of the 57th ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference
Protection against active physical attacks is of serious concerns of cryptographic hardware designers. Introduction of SIFA invalidating several previously-thought-effective countermeasures, made this challenge even harder. Here in this work we deal with error correction, and introduce a methodology which shows, depending on the selected adversary model, how to correctly embed error-correcting codes in a cryptographic implementation. Our construction guarantees the correction of faults, in any location of the circuit and at any clock cycle, as long as they fit into the underlying adversary model. Based on case studies evaluated by open-source fault diagnostic tools, we claim protection against SIFA.
| 발행 연도 | 2020년 |
|---|---|
| 인용수 | 0 |
| 출판 국가 | Germany |
| 사이트 | ACM |
| 좋아요 수 | 0 |