Replay-resistant Disk Fingerprinting via Unintentional Electromagnetic Emanations

Replay-resistant Disk Fingerprinting via Unintentional Electromagnetic Emanations

연구 분야: Infrastructure

학회: RAID '24: Proceedings of the 27th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses

External disks (abbr., disks) are common data storage peripherals for hosts. Verifying the disk’s legitimacy is crucial to prevent security issues on a host like privacy leakage and virus propagation before interaction setup. To address this issue, we propose DiskPrint, a novel non-intrusive and replay-resistant disk authentication system that relies on unintentional electromagnetic (EM) emanations from disks’ internal components. The core idea of DiskPrint is that EM signals emitted during data writing can reflect hardware discrepancies among different disks. Based on electromagnetic principles, we establish a theoretical model associating EM signals with built-in electronic components to demonstrate the feasibility of extracting disk fingerprints from such EM emanations. We also propose a series of signal enhancement methods to remove the EM interface and improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the EM measurements. To boost the security of DiskPrint, we propose a device-agnostic replay-resistant method by introducing randomness into leaked EM signals. Real-world experiments with 60 disks including hard disk drives (HDDs) and solid state drives (SSDs) from seven brands and 14 models indicate that DiskPrint achieves a 99%+ authentication success rate. Robustness analysis demonstrates DiskPrint’s stability over time. Security study shows its ability to defend against various attacks.