Research on the Evolutionary Game of Critical Information Infrastructure Security Supervision under Public on Participation

Research on the Evolutionary Game of Critical Information Infrastructure Security Supervision under Public on Participation

연구 분야: Infrastructure

학회: ICAICE '24: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Computer Engineering

To explore the dynamic evolution patterns of behavioral strategy choices among regulatory authorities, CII operators, and the public in CII security supervision, offering insights for enhancing the security supervision system and optimizing regulatory strategies. Based on evolutionary game theory, a tripartite evolutionary game model involving regulatory authorities, CII operators, and the public was constructed. The evolutionary stability of strategy choices among these players was analyzed, and numerical simulations were conducted using MATLAB 2022a to explore the evolutionary trajectories of the game players. Research indicates that the initial willingness of game players to participate in regulation affects the final stable state of the system.