Handling Exit Node Vulnerability in Onion Routing with a Zero-Knowledge Proof

Handling Exit Node Vulnerability in Onion Routing with a Zero-Knowledge Proof

연구 분야: Strategies

학회: International Conference on Information Integration and Web

Onion routing is a method for anonymous data transfer in a communication network. It is mostly used for the deep web via TOR's (The Onion Router) different services such as TOR browser, Atlas, Orbot, and more. In this network, messages are encrypted with several layers, each layer connects only with its predecessor. An anonymity problem arises at the destination point, the exit node, which is the final node in the onion chain of routing. In the exit node the final layer is decrypted, and the message is delivered to the recipient. The possible vulnerability is that if the exit node is compromised in some way, the attacker can receive the raw data that is being delivered, potentially including sensitive or personal information. There are some ways of handling this issue, such as SSL encryption or secure HTTP, but these are not anonymous by nature as certificates include personal verification. This paper suggests a new method for solving the Exit Node Vulnerability issue that keeps the privacy and anonymity of the network. The method uses Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP), an encryption scheme in which one party (the prover) can validate specific information to another side (the verifier) without disclosing any additional private information. The paper presents the full scheme that solves the Exit Node Vulnerability in Onion routing.