연구 분야: Strategies
학회: International Conference on Embedded Computer Systems: Architectures, Modeling, and Simulation
Hardening microprocessors against side-channel attacks is a critical aspect of ensuring their security. A key step in this process is identifying and mitigating “leaky” hardware modules, which leak information during the execution of cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we explore how different leakage detection methods, the Side-channel Vulnerability Factor (SVF) and the Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA), contribute to hardening of microprocessors. We conduct experiments on two RISC-V cores, SHAKTI and Ibex, using two cryptographic algorithms, SHA-3 and AES. Our findings suggest that SVF and TVLA can provide valuable insights into identifying leaky modules. However, the effectiveness of these methods can vary depending on the specific core and cryptographic algorithm in use. We conclude that the choice of leakage detection method should be based not only on computational cost but also on the specific requirements of the system, the implementation of the algorithm examined and the nature of the potential threats.
| 발행 연도 | 2025년 |
|---|---|
| 인용수 | 0 |
| 출판 국가 | Netherlands |
| 사이트 | Springer |
| 좋아요 수 | 0 |